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Abstract
Background: Purchasing refers to the process by which pooled funds are paid to providers in order to deliver a set of 
health care interventions. Very little is known about purchasing arrangements in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), and certainly not in Kenya. This study aimed to critically analyse purchasing arrangements in Kenya, using the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) as a case study.
Methods: We applied a principal-agent relationship framework, which identifies three pairs of principal-agent 
relationships (government-purchaser, purchaser-provider, and citizen-purchaser) and specific actions required within 
them to achieve strategic purchasing. A qualitative case study approach was applied. Data were collected through 
document reviews (statutes, policy and regulatory documents) and in-depth interviews (n = 62) with key informants 
including NHIF officials, Ministry of Health (MoH) officials, insurance industry actors, and health service providers. 
Documents were summarised using standardised forms. Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analysed 
using a thematic framework approach.
Results: The regulatory and policy framework for strategic purchasing in Kenya was weak and there was no clear 
accountability mechanism between the NHIF and the MoH. Accountability mechanisms within the NHIF have developed 
over time, but these emphasized financial performance over other aspects of purchasing. The processes for contracting, 
monitoring, and paying providers do not promote equity, quality, and efficiency. This was partly due to geographical 
distribution of providers, but also due to limited capacity within the NHIF. There are some mechanisms for assessing 
needs, preferences, and values to inform design of the benefit package, and while channels to engage beneficiaries exist, 
they do not always function appropriately and awareness of these channels to the beneficiaries is limited. 
Conclusion: Addressing the gaps in the NHIF’s purchasing performance requires a number of approaches. Critically, 
there is a need for the government through the MoH to embrace its stewardship role in health, while recognizing the 
multiplicity of actors given Kenya’s devolved context. Relatively recent decentralisation reforms present an opportunity 
that should be grasped to rewrite the contract between the government, the NHIF and Kenyans in the pursuit of universal 
health coverage (UHC).
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Implications for policy makers
• Strategic purchasing requires a policy and regulatory framework that supports, among other things, person-centred evidence-based benefit 
package design.
• Well intentioned policy and actions can inadvertently exacerbate health inequalities, inefficiency and poor quality.
• Strategic purchasing requires capacity in purchasing organizations in contracting, provider payment mechanisms design and implementation, 
and monitoring.
Implications for the public
Improving the way in which funds for health are used for the purpose of obtaining health services is important in making sure every person can 
access health services without suffering financial hardship. Using Kenya’s National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) as an example, we highlight gaps 
in policy and practice in how funds for health are used. We also provide lessons for health stakeholders in Kenya and similar settings.  Implementing 
these recommendations may improve policy and practice and ensure access to needed health services of good quality by all citizens without imposing 
unnecessary financial burden.
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We ommend th  effort to reinstate powe  and politics in
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constituti e of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
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ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
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it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
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Background 
Universal health coverage (UHC) - a situation where every 
citizen has access to needed services, of good quality, without 
getting into financial ruin or impoverishment - is the leading 
global health agenda of the new century.1 UHC’s objectives 
of utilisation based on need, financial risk protection and 
access to quality health services are largely more relevant to 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), although high 
income countries are also continuously looking for ways 
to expand coverage to their populations.2,3 Several LMICs 
are reforming their health systems for UHC. These reforms 
include a greater emphasis on generating additional revenue, 
particularly through domestic resources, moving away from 
out-of-pocket payments towards prepayment of health funds 
through a combination of tax funding and health insurance, 
and minimizing fragmentation in pooling.4-6 
Purchasing, one of the financing health functions (the others 
being revenue generation, and pooling), can be a major cause 
of inefficiencies, inequities, and can undermine access to 
quality services.1 Purchasing refers to the process by which 
pooled funds are paid to providers in order to deliver a set of 
healthcare interventions.1 It involves three actions: (1) selecting 
services and interventions to be purchased, (2) selecting 
service providers, and (3) determining the contractual and 
payment arrangements between the purchaser and providers.7 
Purchasing can be passive or strategic. Strategic purchasing 
involves a continuous search for the best ways to maximise 
health system performance, by deciding which interventions 
should be purchased, how and from what providers, while 
passive purchasing implies following a pre-determined 
budget or simply paying bills when presented.7-10 There is 
evidence of a global move towards strategic purchasing.9 
Experiences from LMICs include the move towards an 
explicit set of prioritised entitlements that citizens can expect 
to receive,11 the use of contracts and the inclusion of non-state 
providers of health services,12 the introduction of a mix and a 
variety of provider payment mechanisms,13,14 and a movement 
towards addressing the organisational structure and capacity 
of purchasing organisations.15,16 
Purchasing in the Kenyan health sector is performed through 
three mechanisms. Under the first mechanism, national 
and county governments purchase healthcare services from 
public healthcare services that they own. Specifically, the 
national Ministry of Health (MoH) owns three tertiary 
care hospitals and pays for services through global budgets. 
County governments own primary and secondary care health 
facilities and pay for these services through line budgets, 
health worker salaries and supply of commodities. Under 
the second mechanism, the National Hospital Insurance 
Fund (NHIF), Kenya’s social health insurer, contracts both 
public and private healthcare facilities to provide services to 
registered members. The final mechanism is utilised by private 
and community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes, 
which contract public and private health service providers to 
provide services to members. These mechanisms have been 
labelled in literature as public integrated, public contract and 
private contract models respectively.17 
This study is part of a larger study that assessed each of the 
three main purchasing arrangements in Kenya. In this paper, 
we focus our attention on critically analysing the purchasing 
arrangements of the NHIF. Established in 1966 as a 
department within the MoH, the NHIF is a semi-autonomous 
government agency. Its mandate was to provide contribution-
based insurance services initially for those in the formal 
sector and later for those in the informal sector.18 A revision of 
the law in 1998, established the NHIF as a state corporation, 
affirmed its mandate to provide coverage for the whole 
population, instituted a governance structure, established new 
contribution rates and specified means for provider selection 
and contracting.19 Membership to the NHIF is compulsory 
for all formal sector workers, and voluntary for the informal 
sector. The NHIF covers about 15% of the Kenyan population, 
approximately 88.4% of all persons with health insurance 
in Kenya.20 The government of Kenya has made a specific 
policy decision to, among others, expand health insurance 
coverage among the population through the NHIF as a means 
to achieving UHC.21 The centrality of the NHIF to proposed 
and continuing health financing reforms in Kenya makes its 
purchasing practices essential to the attainment of UHC and 
therefore an important subject for critical examination.22,23 
Moreover, the NHIF may offer lessons for a broad variety of 
settings that are pursuing UHC using a public contributory 
health insurance mechanism. 
 
Methods
Study Setting
Kenya is a lower-middle income country24 whose health 
system is organized around two major administrative levels: 
national and county. The national government has policy 
and regulatory roles, while the 47 county governments 
have healthcare service provision roles.25 Healthcare service 
provision is pluralistic with an almost equal share of private 
and public providers.26 The health system is organized in tiers 
from community, primary, secondary and tertiary care.27 All 
health facilities should provide services based on the Kenya 
Essential Package for Health (KEPH), a comprehensive life 
cycle and level of care based description of health services 
that the country aspires to deliver to all its citizens.28 
According to the Kenya National Health Accounts 2012-
2013, the main sources of health funding are government 
(31%), private (40%) and donor (25%) expenditure.29 Out-of-
pocket payments constituted 32% of total health expenditure 
(THE).29 In terms of shares of non-capital (current) health 
expenditure (CHE), the main purchasers of health services 
were the MoH (managing 32% of CHE), household (29% 
of CHE with 80% spent through out of pocket payments), 
donors (19%), private health insurers (9%) and the NHIF 
(5%).29 Though these figures precede the devolution of health 
services to county governments, more up-to-date figures are 
unavailable. However, in the absence of significant resource 
generation and pooling reforms, government likely remains 
a major purchaser of health services. The NHIF is financed 
through premium contributions to the national scheme 
from about 5 million registered members and from general 
government revenues which provided full premium subsidies 
for 3500 elderly persons in 2015.30 The NHIF also manages a 
special fund for civil servants, police and the Kenya Defence 
Forces, the Civil Servants and Disciplined Forces Medical 
Scheme, and a full-premium subsidy program for the poor, 
the Health Insurance Subsidy Program.31 The latter covers 
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about 641 688 individuals across the country.32
Study Design and Data Collection
We employed a qualitative case study approach, with the 
NHIF as the study case. Data were collected through in-depth 
interviews (n = 62), and document reviews (statutes, policy and 
regulatory documents). We purposively sampled persons with 
knowledge of health financing and purchasing arrangements 
in Kenya for in-depth interviews. These included officials of 
the MoH, the NHIF, community-based and private health 
insurance, health service providers, regulatory authorities 
and insurance industry associations. The selection of officials 
of community-based and private health insurance (CBHI 
and PHI respectively) was because of their relationship 
with the NHIF. CBHI are community owned and managed 
organisations that provide insurance at village level though 
with limited mostly rural coverage comprising <1% of the 
insured population.33 CBHI act as agents selling NHIF 
insurance as stand-alone or co-packaged products.34-36 CBHI 
officials also provided a window into the relationship between 
the NHIF and citizens. PHI provide voluntary insurance that 
is complementary (top-up) for those mandated to be NHIF 
members (all formal sector workers) and supplementary for 
the rest (mainly informal sector workers).37 PHI cover about 
9% of the insured Kenyan population while the remainder 
are covered by employee insurance schemes.33 Additional 
respondents were identified through snowballing including 
research organizations, development agencies, labour union 
representatives, and lobby groups representing insurers, 
providers and consumers. The interviews were conducted by 
KM and SM, and lasted about 40 minutes each at locations 
convenient to the interviewees. The interviews were audio 
recorded and supplemented by note taking. Interviews were 
conducted between April 2014 and May 2015. Table 1 shows 
the summary of respondents.
Conceptual Framework
We applied a conceptual framework developed by Figueras 
et al9 based on agency theory,38 and further developed by 
the Responsive and Resilient Health Systems (RESYST) 
Consortium.7 In agency theory,38 the principal (the under-
informed party) utilises incentives to induce the agent (the 
informed party) to act in a way that benefits the principal 
based on the assumption that the principal can predict how 
the agent will respond to any particular incentive, and that 
there is an institutional framework which ensures that the 
principal will keep their end of the bargain. This implies 
that the principal can take specific actions to ensure certain 
outcomes: a relationship applicable to the concept of strategic 
purchasing.
The conceptual framework of Figueras et al9 identifies 
three pairs of principal-agent relationships: government-
purchaser, purchaser-provider, and citizen-purchaser. The 
RESYST Consortium7 further unpacked these relationships 
into specific actions that should be undertaken to achieve 
strategic purchasing (Table 2). The framework examined 
the presence or absence of these actions at policy level (to 
identify policy gaps) and in practice (to identify practice gaps) 
based on objective judgment criteria but without specifying 
any pre-determined indicator. This study examined the 
purchasing practices of the NHIF and compared them with 
the theoretical ideal proposed by the RESYST framework for 
strategic purchasing. Only part of the framework and related 
results are presented in this manuscript to highlight key 
findings with more details published elsewhere.7,37
Data Analysis
Data extracted from document review were summarised 
using standardised forms. Audio recordings were transcribed 
verbatim and translated to English, where necessary. 
Transcripts were entered into QSR NVivo 10 for analysis 
using a thematic framework approach. Two researchers 
working independently coded the data, which were charted 
and categorized into themes derived from the conceptual 
framework. The charted data were interpreted by identifying 
and explaining the relationship between key concepts, relating 
this to theoretical assumptions and identifying policy-relevant 
messages. 
Results 
Government-Purchaser Relationship
Weak Regulatory and Policy Framework
The NHIF is governed by the NHIF Act of 1998,19 which outlines 
the mandate and functions of the NHIF. Statutes related to 
the conduct of public corporations and public servants also 
govern the NHIF.25,39,40 However, these statutes were silent on 
strategic purchasing practices. For example, as per strategic 
purchasing ideals, purchasing organizations ought to develop 
a benefit package while taking into consideration population 
needs, national priorities, and evidence of cost-effectiveness. 
Another key task of purchasers is to undertake activities 
that enhance health system efficiency and quality of health 
services. The NHIF Act does not explicitly address these 
issues even though the Kenyan Constitution emphasizes the 
importance of equity and effectiveness as central to meeting 
its citizens’ needs. 
The Kenyan health sector is broadly guided by a long-term 
policy, the Kenya Health Policy (KHP) 2014-2030, and a 
5-year strategic plan, the Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan 
(KHSSP). The policy and strategic plan attempt to address 
strategic purchasing, by highlighting the need to improve 
health systems efficiency and quality. They also prescribe 
a benefit package of services that should be provided to 
Kenyans: KEPH.28 However, there is no explicit linkage 
Table 1. Summary of Respondents
Respondent Number Interviewed
NHIF officials 4
MoH officials 7
Private health insurance officials 13
CBHI officials 17
Insurance regulators 2
Development agencies and research organizations 3
Independent actuaries and consultants 2
Insurance industry association/lobby group 2
Health service providers 9
Provide regulator 1
Civil society 2
Abbreviations: NHIF, National Hospital Insurance Fund; CBHI, community-
based health insurance; MoH, Ministry of Health.
Munge et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(3), 244–254 247
between the policy prescriptions and what the NHIF does 
in practice. For instance, the NHIF’s benefit package was not 
guided by KEPH. We illustrate this in Table 3 which shows the 
list of KEPH services, those provided by the NHIF and a list 
of the top ten causes of disease according the Kenya Health 
Policy.
This table illustrates that cerebrovascular disease and ischemic 
heart disease were among the leading causes of death in 
Kenya in 2009, data on which the KHP was developed, with 
more recent research supporting this finding.44,45 While 
KEPH lists screening for non-communicable diseases using 
blood sugar testing, routine blood pressure and body mass 
index measurement for adults as key intervention,28 this was 
not included in the NHIF benefit package at the time of the 
study but now is. The new benefit package still omits key 
interventions such as immunizations and lacked specificity on 
the interventions covered for example under cervical cancer 
screening. The linkage of inpatient benefits to the category 
of hospital means that access to essential surgical services for 
example following a road traffic accident may be constrained.
Additionally, while the NHIF contracts both public and 
private healthcare providers, KEPH is public sector and 
supply side oriented, which makes it difficult to translate to 
the private sector.26 As illustrated in the table above, KEPH 
contains health promotion and prevention interventions such 
as port health and mass deworming which are usually supplied 
through the public sector. This public sector orientation 
is also identifiable in the KHP which delineates a health 
system architecture that is couched in public sector terms eg, 
hospital levels; while not providing a linkage with purchasing 
mechanisms including the NHIF.43 For example the KHP 
does not mention the NHIF at all, while the KHSSP limits its 
mention of the NHIF to specifying its mandate to “provide 
quality social health insurance” (Table 48, p. 71).27 
The weakness in regulatory and policy framework may be 
contributed to by a lack of stewardship. Data from interviews 
with the MoH suggested a lack of clarity about the role of 
the NHIF, how it should be regulated and whether or not it 
should enjoy the monopoly of being the sole health insurer 
with mandatory membership of formal sector workers: 
“…I think there are indications from partners, stakeholders 
suggesting that we need more than one pool so that people 
can have a choice, you can choose to join NHIF or another 
purchaser of your choice…” [KII_07_MoH].
Weak Accountability Mechanisms
The MoH lacked clear structures to provide oversight of the 
NHIF. While in policy the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
the board of directors were meant to report to the MoH,19 
it was unclear how this supported or encouraged strategic 
purchasing practice. The implication was that monitoring 
reports did not explicitly address purchasing arrangements, 
progress, success and challenges. In practice, there were no 
performance monitoring reports in the public domain and 
open to scrutiny for this paper, and, more significantly, by 
citizens.
The NHIF’s accountability framework was also undermined 
by the absence of a regulatory and policy framework in 
support of strategic purchasing practice. For instance, the 
NHIF was accountable to citizens and government through 
a number of institutions including the MoH, the State 
Corporations Advisory Committee, the National Treasury, 
the Kenya National Audit Office, the Inspector General of 
Corporations, the Efficiency Monitoring Unit and various 
parliamentary committees. These mechanisms were meant 
to ensure that the NHIF worked transparently, and that the 
member contributions were properly utilised.19 For example, 
the NHIF was required to maintain books and prepare 
financial statements listing income, expenditure, assets and 
liabilities.19 In practice, accountability seemed to be more 
concerned with financial performance than with other aspects 
of purchasing activities such as quality of services received by 
members or responsiveness of the NHIF to complaints. 
Inadequate Resources Mobilized to Meet Service Requirements
The NHIF draws its revenues from premium contributions, 
which, as highlighted above, had remained low owing to 
the failure to revise the rates regularly. This failure resulted 
from a policy gap that does not address the process for 
rate revision.46-49 In addition, the reliance on voluntary 
contributions means that NHIF coverage has remained low 
among informal sector workers: 15% in 2015 even though 
they accounted for 82% of the Kenyan workforce.50
Purchaser-Provider Relationship
The Selection of Providers Compromises Equity
The process for contracting hospitals is guided by the NHIF 
accreditation regulations of 2003.19 In practice the NHIF 
contracting process involved four steps: application for 
accreditation, inspection, gazettement and contract signing. 
Table 2. Strategic Purchasing Actions
Strategic purchasing actions for the Government-Purchaser relationship
•	 The government should have policy and legislative frameworks for purchasing activities
•	 The government should ensure the accountability of purchasing organizations
Strategic actions for the Purchaser-Provider relationship
•	 The purchaser should choose and contract health service providers based on their capabilities including the services offered and their geographical 
location
•	 The purchaser should establish mechanisms to ensure service quality including formularies, standard treatment guidelines and essential drug lists
•	 The purchaser should utilise provider payment mechanisms to incentivise efficiency, service quality and promote equitable access
Strategic purchasing actions for the Citizen-Purchaser relationship
•	 The purchaser should develop benefit packages based on an assessment of the needs, preferences and priorities of the target population
•	 The purchaser should establish mechanisms to obtain and respond to complaints and feedback from the population
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Facilities that applied to be accredited were inspected against 
the NHIF’s accreditation manual which included a checklist 
that assessed the availability of infrastructure, facilities, 
equipment, staff and services such as ambulances.51 The 
meaning of accreditation as used by the NHIF is more in 
keeping with contracting rather than a process by which a 
health provider, usually an organization, is assessed against 
a standard developed by an entity separate from that which 
is being assessed.52 The NHIF board of directors acted on the 
recommendations of the inspection and gazetted the hospital. 
The contract signed between the NHIF and the health 
facility specified the category of the health facility, payment 
mechanisms and rates, and other terms of engagement. 
The NHIF contracting process undermined equity. It was 
reported that the rigorous ‘accreditation’ disadvantaged 
some regions, which were historically marginalized, thus 
undermining geographical access. However, there was 
documentary evidence of de-gazettement (effectively contract 
cancellation) of health facilities including publicly owned 
ones for not adhering to NHIF standards.
“…Imagine the only public hospital in say West Pokot 
[6th most marginalised county in Kenya with historical 
underinvestment in social services and amenities], just 
because it doesn’t meet the standards you say you are not 
going to accredit that hospital… and for sure you know that 
members go there… It’s quite an issue, for private not so bad, 
but for public...” [KII_13_NHIF].
Inadequate Quality Assurance Mechanisms
The NHIF’s quality assurance mechanisms included the use 
of pre-contracting accreditation, contractual specification, 
regular inspection, complaints and feedback handling, and 
the advancement of loans to facilities to improve services. 
Contractual documents lacked elements that were critical to 
influencing provider behaviour to the benefit of the purchaser. 
For example, in the sample contract we had access to, the 
NHIF relied on facilities to utilise standards and treatment 
guidelines provided by the MoH even though evidence from 
Kenyan hospitals suggests there is poor adherence to passively 
provided guidance.53-58 
The NHIF was required by law to regularly inspect contracted 
facilities annually and to continuously monitor adherence to 
the standards of care established during its initial inspection. 
A benefits and quality assurance management committee and 
organizational department existed to oversee quality aspects 
of services provided by contracted facilities and act as the 
link between the consumer and the insurer. However this did 
not always happen as the compliance officers largely engaged 
with employers and rarely interacted with the beneficiaries. 
Data from the interviews suggested that the NHIF’s ability 
to continuously monitor standards or quality of services was 
limited:
“No they don’t, what happens with them is that once you have 
a license from the board then they assume that everything is 
OK…” [KII_20_provider].
Table 3. Summary of NHIF Benefit Package, Kenya Essential Package for Health and Top 10 Leading Causes of Mortality in Kenya
NHIF National Scheme Benefit Package41,42
Kenya Essential Package for Health 
201528
Top 10 Causes of Mortality in Kenya 
in 200943
Inpatient benefits depend on category of hospital a
•	 Consultation
•	 Hospital daily charges
•	 Nursing care
•	 Prescribed diagnostic laboratory or other medically necessary 
services
•	 Physician's, surgeon's, anaesthetist’s or physiotherapist's fees
•	 Operating theatre charges
•	 Specialist consultations or visits
•	 Prescribed drugs/medications and dressings
Maternity benefits
•	 Consultation and treatment for both mother and child
•	 Child birth including caesarean section deliveries
•	 Family planning services
Outpatient benefitsb
•	 General consultation
•	 Diagnostics and treatment of common ailments
•	 Laboratory and investigation
•	 Dental services
•	 Prescribed drugs administration and dispensing
•	 Management of chronic ailments (HIV/AIDS, diabetes, asthma, 
hypertension, cancer)
•	 Health and wellness education/healthcare counselling such as 
Screening for conditions eg, cervical and prostate cancer
•	 Treatment of sexually transmitted diseases
•	 Radiology services
•	 Family planning/midwifery/ante/post-natal services
•	 Physiotherapy services
•	 Referral for specialized services
•	 Immunization
•	 Child health
•	 Screening for communicable 
conditions
•	 Antenatal care
•	 Prevention of mother to child HIV 
transmission
•	 Integrated vector management
•	 Good hygiene practices
•	 HIV and STI prevention
•	 Port health
•	 Control and prevention of 
neglected tropical diseases
•	 Community screening for non-
communicable diseases
•	 Institutional screening for non-
communicable diseases
•	 Workplace health and safety
•	 Food quality and safety
•	 Pre-hospital care
•	 HIV/AIDS
•	 Conditions arising during the 
perinatal period
•	 Lower respiratory infections
•	 Tuberculosis
•	 Diarrhoeal diseases
•	 Malaria
•	 Cerebrovascular disease
•	 Ischemic heart disease
•	 Road traffic accidents
•	 Violence
Abbreviations: NHIF, National Hospital Insurance Fund; STI, Sexually transmitted infection.
a Category A: comprehensive cover for all diseases; Category B: comprehensive cover for all diseases though co-pay required for surgical procedures; Category 
C: per diem payment for each night of admission.
b The study was conducted before the introduction of outpatient benefits.
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This was despite the fact that the NHIF had a well functioning 
information system, branch network and organizational 
structure that could have supported monitoring activities. 
This suggests that the focus on the organization was mainly 
on financial propriety: as demonstrated by the recruitment 
of medically trained personnel in the claims checking 
department.
“I think some time in 1995 there was so much fraud I mean 
now claims were being manufactured. And because there 
were no technical people to take care of that, they wouldn’t 
know that actually this is… It was that bad, so that’s the time 
the then management decided okay then we need people at 
least can understand what’s happening” [KII_13_NHIF].
The NHIF Act allowed the advancement of funds to health 
facilities to enable them procure essential medical equipment, 
and in so doing improve quality of services offered to 
beneficiaries. While the process by which this occurred in 
practice was unclear, evidence from interviews suggested that 
some hospitals had benefited from the funding.
“Yeah, upon approval by our board we can lend a facility 
funds and we have done that to Moi Teaching Referral 
[Hospital]. We bought a couple of renal dialysis machines for 
the big facilities” [KII_29_NHIF].
Poorly Implemented Provider Payment Mechanisms
The NHIF board was mandated by the NHIF Act to 
determine provider payment rates based on ownership and 
the accreditation assessment score with the main provider 
payment mechanisms in use being a per-diem rate for inpatient 
services. The new outpatient benefit package was paid for 
using capitation, case-based payments and fee for service for 
specific services such as renal dialysis and radiology services 
respectively. The rationale for the overall provider payment 
system design and the way payment rates were determined 
was unclear. For example, the choice of capitation was guided 
in part by the likelihood of over-servicing that theoretically 
results from fee for service and per diem payments.14 While 
evidence from interviews suggested the use of costing studies 
and actuarial analysis of NHIF utilisation data in developing 
capitation rates, these analyses were not in the public domain 
and it was unclear whether their development included 
stakeholders. The result was that providers, particularly 
private ones, were reluctant to be contracted to provide 
services to the NHIF owing to the low capitation rate which 
they felt could not cover the cost of care.59,60
“Capitation has been attempted a few times…but it has really 
not picked up properly…because a lot of times somebody 
says we are doing an actuarial study but they have got vested 
interests, so the result is already skewed to favour what you 
want to come out of it” [KII_21_provider].
The NHIF had a number of measures to manage unintended 
consequences of these incentives including regular physical 
visits to health facilities to ensure that providers did not 
overcharge; enforced maximum limits on claims payable; 
fraud training of all staff; and, institutionalization of risk 
and investigation departments. The NHIF closely monitored 
claims and made changes to the benefits and quality assurance 
department to include staff with medical backgrounds to 
ensure this was done well. However, interviews with providers 
suggested that physical visits to facilities were the exception, 
not the norm.
“No, for the time I have been here, I have never met [NHIF 
staff] and I’m always in the wards, checking processes…” 
[KII_24_provider].
Citizen-Purchaser Relationship
The Development of the NHIF Benefit Package Is not Linked to 
Needs Assessment, and the Preferences of its Members
The responsibility of designing the benefit package lies with 
the NHIF’s board of directors. The benefit package was broadly 
outlined in the NHIF Act, as both outpatient and inpatient 
services. There was no explicit mention in policy or statute 
on how needs assessment for NHIF beneficiaries ought to be 
done. However, the NHIF board was required to protect the 
interests of contributors, including regulating contribution 
rates and benefit package. In practice, the NHIF used a variety 
of means to determine health needs of the population and 
inform the design of the benefit package, including customer 
satisfaction surveys; feedback received from board members 
and analysis of claims data. However, no formal needs 
assessment activities were undertaken and it was recognized 
that citizen engagement required improvement. 
To promote awareness of the benefit package and the accredited 
providers, the NHIF published detailed information about the 
benefit package and providers on the website and advertised 
widely in the media. Evidence from interviews with citizens 
who were also members of CBHI schemes suggested 
dissatisfaction with benefit package contents, information 
on access to providers and cover for extended families and 
indigents within the community.
“Those people who contribute to the NHIF through the 
[CBHI] schemes are the ones who benefit the most because 
they know which hospitals are good and which hospitals are 
bad. Those others who have deductions made from their 
salaries are taken here and there; no one tells you which 
hospital to go to” [CBHI_01].
“Yeah actually we accommodate because the more members 
the more money…and it’s a challenge to the NHIF; there they 
have a maximum, but with us we can accommodate more 
members, more families. You can even take an orphan to 
bring into your family…so the community realizes it’s a good 
move, because you can take somebody’s care even though you 
are not related” [CBHI_15].
A related area of concern was the large proportion of operating 
expenses taken up by administrative expenses (Table 4). These 
were perceived as being high by stakeholders46,61 because this 
meant that a significant proportion of resources were spent 
on non-claim settling activities. The NHIF believed that the 
proportion of administrative expenses would decline over 
time, largely due to the revised contribution rates which 
were nearly 5-fold those previously charged.62 More up-to-
date financial statements were not available to the authors 
for assessment, and the financial statements accessed in 2015 
have since been removed from the NHIF website.63 However, 
the contribution figures are corroborated by those reported in 
other government documents such as the Economic Survey.50
“But then people fail to understand one thing, that we have 
had contribution rates stuck since 1989 about over twenty-
something years now…all along NHIF has been expanding, 
growing...When we got this civil servants scheme, we brought 
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down that percentage to 28 [%] without doing anything…
just having them entering as revenue and going out as whole 
payments to benefits...” [KII_29_NHIF].
Though the NHIF’s benefit package was fairly comprehensive, 
its measures for protecting beneficiaries from the financial 
burden of ill health were likely to be ineffective. First, the 
payment rates for capitation and inpatient reimbursements 
were perceived to be low by providers.64 This led to balance 
billing by healthcare providers. Second, the NHIF cap on 
benefits was at 180 days of admission. Third, members 
incurred penalties for late payment of premiums. Previously 
five times the unpaid up amount, these penalties had been 
reduced in 2014 so that informal sector members, who 
made voluntary premium contributions, were required to 
pay 25% of the amount defaulted as penalties while formal 
sector members were required to pay a penalty of two times 
the unpaid amount.65 Finally, the NHIF covered a small 
proportion of the population and excluded non-contributors 
who were more likely to be the poor.20 Moreover, retaining 
voluntary members was a challenge. This segment of 
members, made up mostly of informal sector workers, tended 
to take up insurance only when they were ill, and would allow 
their membership to lapse especially when they had not made 
claims that year, or when they realized that they could not 
access outpatient benefits. The application of penalties for 
failure to keep up with premium payments was also cited as 
affecting retention. 
“They will come in, you will only get the sick ones most of the 
times and when they come in they come with the intention 
of accessing the benefits. And when they access the benefits 
many of them do not continue when they come. So if you 
look at the claims ratio for the informal sector vis-à-vis the 
other sectors it’s very high” [ KII_30_NHIF].
To cater for this, the NHIF had made administrative 
arrangements allowing members to either make up the 
missed payments within 5 days or start over again with a 60-
day exclusion period. 
Inadequate Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms
The NHIF Act does not provide for feedback or complaints 
mechanism for beneficiaries or members. However, the board 
of directors was composed of key stakeholders including 
labour unions, while provisions of the public officer ethics 
act covered some of these concerns.40 For example, the NHIF 
employees were required to seek to improve the performance 
of their organization and give honest and impartial advice to 
all.
The NHIF website provided an email address and phone 
contact for use by beneficiaries. Newspaper advertisements, 
and interviews, specified that the phone line was toll free 
and operated 24 hours a day. Our attempts to access the 
toll-free number during the study period were unsuccessful. 
The NHIF’s use of its website, newspapers and media 
pronouncements to inform the populace of its service 
entitlements limited the reach of its messages to those who 
had access to these media. Furthermore, there was no public 
forum for reporting performance.
While there was evidence that these feedback mechanisms did 
work, for example resulting in the redesign of the enrolment 
form, it was unclear what processes were in place to regularly 
incorporate this feedback in benefit package design and other 
aspects of purchasing performance. While interviews with 
NHIF officials suggested that changes to the benefit package 
and premium rates were based on member feedback, the 
process of implementation of these changes was met with stiff 
opposition from labour unions and the general population.48,49 
Discussion 
The NHIF remains the main purchaser of healthcare services 
for the insured in Kenya. While several efforts have been 
directed towards improving its purchasing arrangements, 
there are shortcomings when examined through the lens of 
ideal strategic purchasing practice. These shortcomings were 
identifiable along all three principal-agent axes. 
Policy and regulatory frameworks are essential to strategic 
purchasing practice. For example, Ghana’s UHC reforms of 
the National Health Insurance Scheme, is based on series 
of policy and legal structures, the most recent of which has 
faced challenges after a period of initial success in improving 
coverage.66 However, policy implementation requires specific 
attributes such as planning and negotiating skills, which are 
absent in many health system practitioners in LMICs.67,68 This 
implies that both areas ie, policy development and policy 
implementation are key targets for ensuring the adoption of 
strategic purchasing practice. Kenya’s decentralised context 
presents an additional if surmountable challenge to the policy 
development and implementation process. Decentralisation 
can result in a policy and practice impasse particularly where 
reforms are a consequence of broader reforms.69,70
The absence of a policy and regulatory framework for 
strategic purchasing in Kenya was exacerbated by a lack 
of clarity at the MoH about the centrality of the NHIF to 
health financing reforms. This had the potential to deny the 
NHIF the advantages of monopsony power. This power is 
particularly useful in directing provider action for example 
in negotiating price or even service delivery structure. In 
Table 4. Comparing NHIF Contributions and Operating Expenses
2014 2013 2012a 2011
KES '000b KES '000 KES '000 KES '000
Contributions (national scheme and civil servants and disciplined 
forces medical scheme)
13 629 140 12 229 966 9 595 592  6 628 729 
Operating expenses less benefit expenses  3 982 803  3 527 918  3 287 600  2 780 489 
Operating expenses as a percentage of contributions 29% 29% 34% 42%
Abbreviation: NHIF, National Hospital Insurance Fund.
a Start of Civil Servants and Disciplined Forces Medical Scheme.
b KES: Thousands of Kenya Shillings ie, the first cell would be 13.629 Billion.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NHIF Financial statements (2012-2014).
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Thailand, for example, the National Health Security Office 
(NHSO) drove the development of primary care networks 
which have increased access to services and allowed for better 
management of financial resources.71 As such, the lack of 
stewardship from the MoH undermined strategic purchasing 
action of the NHIF.
This study was not set up to examine the link between 
organisational structures and institutional arrangements 
of the NHIF and its purchasing actions. However, previous 
assessments of the NHIF have recognised the need to address 
issues such as the governance and accountability arrangements 
in the organization.61 Recent reforms have sought to alter 
the governance structure of the NHIF for example through 
changes to the board and to the recruitment process for 
the chief executive officer.65 Future research should explore 
the effects of these changes and the potential for further 
alignment of the NHIF as an organization towards strategic 
purchasing practice.
Quality of care is a complex issue with limited evidence of 
what works in practice.58,72 Nevertheless, literature suggests a 
number of policy levers that could be utilised by purchasers 
to influence quality and efficiency of the health system.73 
Strategic purchasing offers an approach that would enable 
the implementation of quality improvement strategies using 
a whole systems perspective.74 Underlying the relationship 
between the purchaser and provider is the contract whose key 
elements should include the type of service to be delivered, 
specification of performance requirements, its duration and 
proposed payment mechanism.9,75,76 As the findings indicate, 
the NHIF’s accreditation and contracting process, while well 
intended is very infrastructure oriented and does not address 
process and outcome aspects of quality of care. Contract 
enforcement remains a challenge, while other key elements 
are not comprehensively addressed. In Thailand’s Universal 
Coverage scheme, the contract specifies the contracting 
unit, catchment area for primary care facilities as well as 
provider payment mechanisms.71,77 On the other hand, rigid 
contracting mechanisms contributed to the lack of strategic 
purchasing observed in neighbouring Vietnam.78 In Nigeria, 
the complex contractual relationship between providers, 
health management organizations and the National Health 
Insurance Scheme weakened strategic purchasing practice in 
the Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme.79
The NHIF inpatient-only benefit package favoured hospitals, 
at the expense of lower end facilities that were predominantly 
used by the poor.80 This arrangement had the potential 
to promote inequities and inefficiency for example by 
promoting hospital utilisation for illnesses that could be 
managed at primary care level. Strategic purchasing offers the 
opportunity to correct the misdirection of care that favours 
curative services at the expense of preventive and promotive 
services.81 Strategic purchasing can address equity in hospital 
care by selecting providers in a way that expands geographic 
access,7 and set priorities for hospital services in relation to 
social and public health priorities.82 Hospital efficiency can 
also be improved through better alignment of referral systems, 
integration of care, selection of cost-effective services, and 
specialisation.82
Overall, the effect of different provider payment mechanisms 
on the healthcare system depends on their design, how 
their mix reflects the local context and how well they are 
implemented.13,14 Our findings suggest shortcomings in all 
three of these aspects. Besides the lack of information on how 
the payment systems were designed or rates were arrived at, 
this significant health financing reform lacked the required 
buy in from the various stakeholders including providers.83 
Moreover, these changes did little to address key contextual 
issues such as the power of providers over purchasers which 
limited strategic purchasing actions. This power was the 
result of a limited supply of providers in quality, quantity and 
spread; better lobbying and negotiating ability; multiplicity 
of revenue sources for providers including out of pocket 
payments; and provider control of key processes such as 
licensing and price setting. In addition, the continued use 
of fee for service, for example, opened the health system to 
over servicing and other forms of inefficiency in the absence 
of clear goals to increase access to certain services.1,9,14 There 
were no mechanisms in place at the time of the study to deal 
with the potential shortcomings of capitation which can 
lead to reduced provision of services and increased referral 
to higher levels of care.14 With evidence of weak monitoring 
of service delivery, there is little to guarantee that these 
unintended consequences are not already present among 
NHIF contracted providers. 
The results have shown that the link between the beneficiaries 
and the NHIF is weak. This manifests itself in various ways 
including in a benefit package that deviates not only from 
policy design for access to care but also from burden of 
disease patterns as illustrated in this paper. Following on 
from the example of screening for non-communicable 
disease, the newly introduced outpatient benefit package 
is still silent on the specific interventions that fall under 
this service category.41 The lack of this linkage potentially 
undermines progress to UHC, and to the attainment of 
wider societal goals such as health standard maximisation.43 
This disconnect is all the more important in a country that 
is considering mobilizing resources through mandatory 
contributory health insurance. Limited citizen engagement 
may undermine not only premium contributions but also 
willingness to contribute to the NHIF through tax revenue: 
a key source of domestic financing essential for UHC.84,85 
Equity in utilization and financial risk protection are similarly 
undermined by the NHIF’s action and inaction. Segmenting 
the population, limiting coverage to contributors and penalties 
for non-payment result in a barrier to access to financial risk 
protection and to health services. Besides low NHIF coverage 
in the informal sector, benefit incidence analysis suggests 
a predominantly pro-rich distribution of health service 
benefits.86 Evidence from an assessment of effective coverage 
confirms the inequitable receipt of effective health services.87 
As such, the NHIF may inadvertently exacerbate existing 
inequalities and risk of financial catastrophe and so deviate 
from strategic purchasing’s pursuit of UHC goals.
The findings presented in this paper offer lessons for policy 
makers in other LMICs. First, it highlights the need to 
develop and implement a strategic purchasing framework. 
This framework would necessarily be embedded in a wider 
health financing strategy and health sector regulatory 
framework that identifies clearly with local contexts. Included 
in this framework would be key provisions that would address 
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the shortcomings on the three principal-agent relationships. 
On the government-purchaser axis, the framework should 
support the development and implementation of policy 
and regulations that support strategic purchasing. Needs 
assessment and elicitation of feedback and complaints, on 
the citizen-purchaser axis, should be formalised with clear 
mechanisms for including their findings in benefit package 
design. Moreover, benefit packages should offer sufficient 
financial risk protection by being universally available, with 
regulations on balance billing and with explicit exclusions 
that consider equity. Contracts with providers should 
encourage quality and efficiency by specifying key actions 
and conditions. These would include the selection and 
use of evidence-based treatment guidelines and essential 
drug lists by providers, the utilisation of an optimal mix of 
provider payment mechanisms, and the use of information to 
monitor provider performance. These contracts would need 
to be supported by policy that give purchasers room to chose 
who they contract with, provider payment mechanisms and 
payment rates. 
Conclusion
While this study examined purchasing arrangements of the 
NHIF, we appreciate that this is a partial analysis, and that 
a health system performance is influence by the interaction 
between all health financing functions. Nonetheless, our 
analysis offers important insights into an often neglected 
health financing function, purchasing, and specifically 
the actions of a key purchasing agent in Kenya, the NHIF. 
Addressing the gaps in the NHIF’s purchasing performance 
requires a number of approaches. Critically, there is a 
need for the government through the MoH to embrace its 
stewardship role in health, while recognizing the multiplicity 
of actors given Kenya’s devolved context. Relatively recent 
decentralisation reforms present an opportunity that should 
be grasped to rewrite the contract between the government, 
the NHIF and Kenyans in the pursuit of UHC.
Specifically, we recommend the development of a policy and 
regulatory framework for strategic purchasing practices. 
This would lay the ground for strategic purchasing 
practice for the NHIF that would be inclusive, coherent 
and contextual. Inclusiveness would mean including 
stakeholders where needed, coherence would mean fitting 
with wider policy while context would mean accounting 
for current decentralised arrangements and labour market 
structure. This framework would also address our second 
key recommendation for a person-centred and evidence-
based benefit package. Given recent reforms surrounding 
the benefit package, our recommendation is that the NHIF’s 
new package should be critically examined to a whether 
it reflects the needs, preferences and values of Kenyan 
citizens and fits with national priorities and goals. Our final 
recommendation concerns ensuring the quality of care and 
the appropriate use of incentives to guide provider behaviour 
in pursuit of this goal. We propose that the NHIF take urgent 
measures to review its quality assurance mechanisms, and 
in particular consider the incentives generated by its mix of 
provider payment mechanisms, monitoring capabilities and 
contractual requirements. 
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